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COMMENTS
FEDERAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FROM ILLEGAL SEARCH
Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966)
On December 24, 1964, a police officer was shot and wounded in the
course of an armed robbery in Baltimore. Early the following morning,
another officer was fatally shot while searching for the robbery suspects.
Suspecting that the second shooting was the work of those wanted for the
robbery, the Baltimore police organized a special squad to apprehend
them. The squad had a warrant for the suspects' arrest, but had no war-
rants to make any of the more than 300 searches-mostly of dwellings of
Negroes--conducted between December 25 and January 12 in their efforts
to arrest the suspects. Teams of officers conducted these searches by sur-
rounding a house and sending a party of heavily-armed officers to the
door; when the door was opened, an officer immediately entered and began
to search without obtaining the occupants' consent. Most of the searches,
which were conducted in a manner which often caused embarrassment and
discomfort, were made on the basis of anonymous phone tips.
The plaintiffs, Negroes whose residences had been searched, brought an
action in the district court seeking a temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction against the continuation of these tactics. No re-
straining order issued. Three days later, the police commissioner issued a
General Order declaring that an officer must have "probable cause" to
believe that a suspect for whom an arrest warrant has been issued is present
before he may search the premises, and the searches without warrants
ceased. Thereafter, the district court refused to issue a preliminary in-
junction against further illegal searches.'
In the district court, the plaintiffs had brought their action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964),2 claiming that the police's actions violated both
the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
The court found that the plaintiffs had standing to assert both claims as
members of the class whose constitutional rights were allegedly being
threatened. The court held that the evidence was insufficient to support
a finding of racial discrimination in the conduct of the searches and denied
the equal protection claim. However, with respect to the due process claim,
1. Lankford v. Schmidt, 240 F. Supp. 550 (D. Md. 1965), rev'd. sub nom. Lankford
v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
2. Actually, the jurisdiction of the district court was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1343
(1964), under the substantive authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
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the court held that searches based on anonymous phone tips are invalid
because not grounded on probable cause. In addition, the court found
that the consent of the occupants of the residences searched had not been
established. An injunction was denied, however, because it appeared that
the relief was unnecessary. The illegal searches had almost completely
stopped by the time the police commissioner took action, and the district
court was of the opinion that he would make a bona fide effort to prevent
such searches in the future. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' em-
phasized the flagrancy of the police invasion of the rights of innocent citi-
zens and the inadequacy of any possible redress at law. The appellate court
found the General Order inadequate as a guarantee against possible re-
currences of widespread illegal searches. The court noted the recent out-
breaks of racial violence in urban areas and decided that, by suppressing
police violation of Negro citizens' rights, it could alleviate the tension be-
tween the police and the Negro community, a probable cause of racial
violence.' The district court was ordered to enjoin the police department
from conducting further searches of residences based solely on anonymous
telephone tips.
The Fourth Circuit's decision is unique. The court's opinion suggests
that the federal courts may play a larger role in controlling unlawful police
conduct when individual constitutional rights are threatened. More sig-
nificantly, it also raises the question of whether, when illegal law enforce-
ment practices have racial overtones, the value of a decree in solving com-
munity racial problems should be considered together with, or possibly to
the exclusion of, conventional equity criteria in deciding whether injunctive
relief will be granted. Never has an American court of equity avowedly
undertaken to weigh the prospect of establishing racial peace in a community
while deciding the appropriateness of enjoining illegal law enforcement
practices.
Federal statutes provide the foundation for federal court authority to
deal with the acts of state and local police which invade rights secured by
the fourth and fourteenth amendments.5 Anyone who is acting under
3. Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
4. See id. at 203-04. For a vivid illustration of the potential result of racial unrest
see CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, VIOLENCE IN THE CITY-AN END OR A BEGIN-
NING (1965).
5. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964); see 28 U.S.C. § 1343(1964).
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color of state law when he violates another person's constitutional rights
is liable to the injured person, regardless of an otherwise valid governmental
immunity. Until recently, there has been considerable controversy' as to
whether section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act,' the under-color-of-state-law
provision, restricts federal jurisdiction to cases in which a state officer is
actually acting within the scope of his authority under state law. This
problem has been authoritatively resolved: there is federal jurisdiction over
actions against state officers who violate citizens' constitutional rights while
clothed in the apparent authority of their state office.8 No jurisdictional
amount or diversity of citizenship requirement to invoke federal jurisdiction
is present under section 1983. There is ample authority for the use of
section 1983 as a basis for federal jurisdiction in false arrest and false im-
prisonment actions, and in actions for damages for unconstitutional searches
and seizures." By contrast, federal suits for equitable relief from illegal
police procedures have been rare."
Injunctive relief has been granted in the few reported federal cases in
which police conduct found violative of constitutional rights has been
challenged in equity suits. 2
6. See generally Annot., 13 A.L.R. 390, 454-63 (1950); Foote, Tort Remedies for
Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493, 509-11 (1953); James,
Federal Equity Jurisdiction to Enjoin Acts of State Officers, 18 IowA L. REV. 1 (1932);
Comment, 37 N.D.L. Rrv. 433 (1961).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). The text of this section is set out in note 5 supra; its
predecessor contained similar language. See Rav. STAT. § 1979 (1875).
8. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Thus, the officer may also be violating
state law.
9. Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, rehearing denied, 319 U.S. 782 (1943);
Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1954); 1 BARRON
& HOLTzOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 37 (Wright ed. 1960).
10. See, e.g., Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965); Rue v. Snyder, 249
F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Tenn. 1966); Selico v. Jackson, 201 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
11. There appears to be no doctrinal obstacle to granting equitable relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1964); the ancient dictum in Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 413, 36
Eng. Rep. 670, 674 (Ch. 1818), that equity grants relief only from invasions of property
rights and not from invasions of personal rights, if it ever was a rule, has now fallen into
disrepute. See Stead v. Fortner, 255 Ill. 468, 478, 99 N.E. 680, 684 (1912); Common-
wealth v. McGovern, 116 Ky. 212, 238, 75 S.W. 261, 267 (1903); People ex rel. Ben-
nett v. Laman, 277 N.Y. 368, 14 N.E.2d 439 (1938); Comment, 15 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 227
(1948). It has been argued that even the English courts have never consistently followed
this dictum. See Moscovitz, Civil Liberties and Injunctive Protection, 39 ILL. L. Rav.
144 (1944). Regardless of its status, this dictum should not be allowed to thwart the
clear purpose of Congress to provide an equitable remedy for violations of all constitu-
tional rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) (specifically authorizes a "suit in equity");
Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 839, 847 (1964); Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78
HARV. L. Rv. 996, 998-1001 (1965).
12. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877 (8th
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Two of these decisions involved the use of unlawful arrests, forcible
ejections from the city, and other harassing tactics on a massive scale by
police in labor disputes. 3 Another court enjoined the repeated efforts of
police, through unlawful arrests and incommunicado interrogation, to
coerce a confession from the plaintiff.'" Each of these cases presented the
court with instances of police conduct so clearly unlawful and so obviously
motivated by bad faith and the purpose of accomplishing an improper
object that the court faced no real problem in deciding whether to grant
relief. None of these cases forced the courts to develop standards to govern
the exercise of their discretion, because relief was so clearly available under
any reasonable standard.
The proper decision was not so obvious, however, in Sellers v. Johnson."
There, a meeting of the Jehovah's Witnesses, held in a city park where
hostile bystanders had gathered, had resulted in a melee. Nevertheless, the
Witnesses were planning to hold another meeting. The defendant sheriff
had received reports from the sheriffs of neighboring communities that
carloads of hecklers were bound for the proposed meeting site bent on
trouble. This prompted the defendant to blockade the roads leading to
the site and to turn the Witnesses away. They filed a petition for injunctive
relief to protect their first amendment right to assemble peaceably. The
trial court dismissed the petition, but the Eighth Circuit found that the
facts presented an appropriate case for granting relief." Bad faith on the
part of the sheriff was not obvious, and under the circumstances his au-
thority to act to avert a clear and present danger of a riot was at least
colorable. But the Court decided that the reports of possible trouble from
hecklers were insufficient to warrant abridging the plaintiff's freedom of
assembly and indicated that the defendant should have used his resources
to protect this right against the threatened unlawful interference. The
case was resolved entirely by the use of first amendment standards; no test
of general applicability to guide discretion in cases involving law enforce-
ment practices which threaten other constitutional rights was evolved.
In contrast to this paucity of federal authorities, numerous state cases
have dealt with injunctions against unlawful law enforcement tactics.
Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 851 (1948); Refoule v. Ellis, 74 F. Supp. 336 (N.D.
Ga. 1947); American Steel Wire Co. v. Davis, 261 Fed. 800 (N.D. Ohio 1919).
13. In Hague, the police obstructed the union's efforts to organize; in American Steel
Wire Co., they prevented strike-breakers from getting to work.
14. Refoule v. Ellis, 74 F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Ga. 1947).
15. 69 F. Supp. 778 (S.D. Iowa 1946), rev'd, 163 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 851 (1948).
16. Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 851
(1948).
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Most of these cases, however, concern invasions of business interests, rather
than denials of individual liberty. They typically involve such tactics as
stationing officers on or near business premises,17 searching the premises or
customers repeatedly,"8 seizing property,"9 or questioning customers exces-
sively-discouraging them, even if unintentionally, from patronizing the
plaintiff's business.2"
These cases are distinguishable from federal actions which may be
brought under section 198321 in that the plaintiffs rely on commercial
damage, rather than the impairment of individual liberties, as the injury
which entities them to relief.22 Nevertheless, the criteria developed by the
state courts for granting relief in these business-oriented cases can be ex-
pected to serve as at least a point of reference for the federal courts in
granting injunctions against police action under section 1983.
The issues, which have been considered by state courts, in deciding
whether injunctive relief from police activities is appropriate include the
following:
17. See, e.g., Burns v. McAdoo, 113 App. Div. 165, 99 N.Y. Supp. 51 (1906); Leib
Restaurant Corp. v. Wallander, 65 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
18. See, e.g., Uptown Enterprises v. Strand, 195 Cal. App. 2d 45, 15 Cal. Rptr. 486
(1961); Cleary v. McAdoo, 113 App. Div. 178, 99 N.Y. Supp. 60 (1906).
19. See, e.g., Stevens v. McAdoo, 112 App. Div. 458, 98 N.Y. Supp. 553 (1906);
Seaboard New York Corp. v. Wallander, 192 Misc. 227, 80 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct.
1948).
20. See, e.g., Delaney v. Flood, 183 N.Y. 323, 76 N.E. 209 (1906); Hagan v. Mc-
Adoo, 113 App. Div. 506, 99 N.Y. Supp. 255 (1906).
In many cases the claims for relief were not based solely on business interests; the
police activity complained of violated both the plaintiff's constitutional rights and his
property rights in his business or livelihood. See, e.g., City of Louisville v. Lougher, 209
Ky. 299, 272 S.W. 748 (1925) (freedom of speech-financial interest in giving a speech
for hire); Higgins v. Krogman, 140 N.J. Eq. 518, 55 A.2d 175 (Ch. 1947), afj'd, 142
N.J. Eq. 691, 61 A.2d 444 (Sup. Ct. Err. & App. 1948) (freedom from unlawful arrest
-right to sell merchandise); Gurtov v. Williams, 105 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937) (freedom from unlawful arrest-right to organize for collective bargaining).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
22. Noting the preferred status of a claim for the protection of constitutional rights
as compared to one for the protection of mere business interests, it might be expected
that courts would create a general presumption in favor of injunctive relief when the
former is involved. At present, however, the presumption is that state equity courts lack
the power to grant such relief. See Harmon v. Commissioner of Police, 274 Mass. 56,
174 N.E. 198 (1931); Delaney v. Flood, 183 N.Y. 323, 76 N.E. 209 (1906); Conte v.
v. Roberts, 58 R.I. 353, 192 Atl. 814 (1937); Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1007, 1016-17
(1962). The theory behind this presumption is that interference with the enforcement
of the criminal law is against public policy. In City of Jacksonville v. Wilson, 157 Fla.
838, 27 So. 2d 108 (1946), the court reasoned that, even though the lower court's in-
junction forbade only unlawful police conduct, the very issuance of an injunction gives
a court a role in supervising law enforcement activities and such supervision necessarily
imposes a burden on police officers in the lawful performance of their duties.
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(1) The traditional prerequisites for equitable relief. These include the
inadequacy of a remedy at law,23 "clean hands,"2 and the irreparability
of the plaintiff's injury.25 However, the existence of an adequate legal
remedy may be a meaningless factor, since all legal remedies appear to
have some built-in disadvantages. 6
(2) Whether the police conduct was beyond the scope of the officers' dis-
cretionary authority. No injunction will issue if the plaintiff fails to carry
his burden of proving clearly that the police acted without reasonable
grounds or probable cause. If the evidence is conflicting, the plaintiff
will be left to his remedy at law. If the facts are uncontroverted, however,
dnd the court finds no reasonable basis for the police actions, injunctive
relief will probably be granted.2"
(3) The intent with which the police act. If police officers are honestly
trying to perform their duties, if they are acting in good faith, courts are
reluctant to enjoin them even when they have unlawfully invaded the
plaintiff's rights." If they are acting maliciously or corruptly, they will
23. See City of Louisville v. Lougher, 209 Ky. 299, 272 S.W. 748 (1925); Burkitt v.
Beggans, 103 N.J. Eq. 7, 142 At. 181 (Ch. 1928); Delaney v. Flood, 183 N.Y. 323, 76
N.E. 209 (1906); Klinger v. Ryan, 91 Misc. 71, 153 N.Y. Supp. 937 (Sup. Ct. 1915);
Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1007 (1962).
24. See Randolph v. Kensler, 95 Kan. 32, 147 Pac. 1132 (1915) (semble); Delaney
v. Flood, 183 N.Y. 323, 76 N.E. 209 (1906); Monfrino v. Gutelius, 66 Ohio App. 293,
33 N.E.2d 1003 (1939).
25. See Ruty v. Huelsenbeck, 109 N.J. Eq. 273, 156 At. 922 (Ch. 1931); Gurtov v.
Williams, 105 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
26. In his dissenting opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), Mr. Justice
Murphy pointed out some of the infirmities of conventional legal remedies. For example,
when statutes provide criminal penalties for illegal police conduct, victims of such con-
duct cannot expect enforcement: it is unreasonable to expect prosecutors to prosecute
those with whom they work closely and upon whom they rely. Actions for trespass to
land or chattels will fail unless the plaintiff can show that the trespassing officers caused
property damage; punitive damages may be unavailable, or may be granted only when
express malice is proved. Sovereign immunity may preclude any civil recovery. Id. at
41-44. See Edwards, Criminal Liability for Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 41 VA.
L. REv. 621 (1955) ; Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39
MINN. L. REv. 493 (1955).
27. See Joyner v. Hammond, 199 Iowa 919, 200 N.W. 571 (1924); Kalwin Business
Men's Ass'n. v. McLaughlin, 216 App. Div. 6, 214 N.Y. Supp. 507 (1926); Seaboard
N.Y. Corp. v. Wallander, 192 Misc. 227, 80 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Monfrino v.
Gutelius, 66 Ohio App. 293, 33 N.E.2d 1003 (1939).
28. City of Louisville v. Lougher, 209 Ky. 299, 272 S.W. 748 (1925); Hagan v.
McAdoo, 113 App. Div. 506, 99 N.Y. Supp. 255 (1906); see Higgins v. Krogman, 104
N.J. Eq. 518, 55 A.2d 175 (Ch. 1947), aff'd, 142 N.J. Eq. 691, 61 A.2d 444 (Sup. Ct.
Err. & App. 1948).
29. See Wood Bros. Thresher Co. v. Eicher, 231 Iowa 550, 1 N.W.2d 655 (1942);
Commission Row Club v. Lambert, 161 S.W.2d 732 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942); Andrieux
v. City of Butte, 44 Mont. 557, 121 Pac. 291 (1912); Kalwin Business Men's Ass'n. v.
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be enjoined." It has been emphasized, however, that the showing of bad
faith must be clear.31
There is language in some opinions to the effect that an injunction
should be denied if it might interefere with legitimate law enforcement ac-
tions that might be taken against the plaintiff.32 This, however, is really an
objection to injunctions which are not drafted narrowly enough to cover
only police conduct that will be illegal under any circumstances. 3
These are guides calculated to balance the public interest in unfettered,
efficient law enforcement against the need to protect individual rights from
police encroachment. They purport to allow for the maximum possible
freedom for officers acting honestly and reasonably, and to protect in-
dividual rights against malicious and unreasonable actions which are val-
ueless in terms of the public's legitimate concern for effective law-enforce-
ment.
Similarly, the Lankford decision emphasized such conventional equitable
criteria as the inadequacy of legal remedies for the victims of the raids, 4
the plaintiffs' innocence of any wrongdoing,3" and the fact that searches
made solely on the basis of anonymous telephone tips were clearly abuses
of authority36 and were flagrantly repeated. Neither bad faith nor malice
McLaughlin, 216 App. Div. 6, 214 N.Y. Supp. 507 (1926); Seaboard N.Y. Corp. v.
Wallander, 192 Misc. 227, 80 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Monte Vulture Social
Club Inc. v. Wallander, 189 Misc. 162, 68 N.Y.S.2d 657 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
30. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); American Steel Wire Co. v. Davis, 261
Fed. 800 (N.D. Ohio 1919); Uptown Enterprises v. Strand, 195 Cal. App. 2d 45, 15
Cal. Rptr. 486 (1961); Hagan v. McAdoo, 113 App. Div. 506, 99 N.Y. Supp. 255 (1906);
Gurtov v. Williams, 105 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). But see City of Jackson-
ville v. Wilson, 157 Fla. 838, 27 So. 2d 108 (1946).
31. 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 111 (1945); see Leib Restaurant Corp. v. Wallander, 65
N.Y.S.2d 479 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
32. See Unity Contract Bridge Club v. Wallander, 187 Misc. 23, 63 N.Y.S.2d 455
(Sup. Ct. 1946); Burns v. McAdoo, 113 App. Div. 165, 174-75, 99 N.Y. Supp. 51, 57-58
(1906) (dissenting opinion).
33. Note, for example, the manner in which injunctions issued by trial courts were
modified on appeal to restrict their scope in Des Moines Drug Co. v. Doe, 202 Iowa
1162, 211 N.W. 694 (1927), and City of Louisville v. Lougher, 209 Ky. 299, 272 S.W.
748 (1925). The injunction ordered in Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir.
1966), is confined to searches of residences for suspects not known to reside there, con-
ducted solely on the basis of anonymous telephone tips, a basis which the court held
insufficient, as a matter of law, to furnish probable cause to believe that the suspects
were present.
34. Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 1966).
35. Id. at 201.
36. Id. at 202.
37. Id. at 201-02.
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was expressly attributed to the police, but the court pointed out that the
high-ranking police officials who authorized the raids could have done
so only by deliberately disregarding elementary individual rights."8 The
injunction granted, forbidding only searches of residences for non-residents
made solely on the basis of anonymous telephone tips, was so narrowly
drafted that it applies only to conduct which is clearly illegal, and could
never encroach on the lawful exercise of police officers' discretion. Although
the raids had ceased when the district court's decision was rendered, the
long-standing police practice of using these tactics on a smaller scale was
found sufficient, by the appellate court, to justify the granting of an in-
junction. 9
Thus, the issuance of an injunction was fully justified by a well-reasoned
application of conventional equitable criteria. The court, however, point-
edly made the additional argument that an injunction would benefit the
community by insuring against the recurrence of police violations of the
rights of Negro citizens, and thereby contributing to peace between the
races, 40 an argument grounded on the assumption that the illegal law en-
forcement tactics of the Baltimore police were a cause of racial tensions.
Thus, Lankford left a significant question unanswered. Will the issues
which have been controlling under conventional equity doctrine be con-
sidered decisive by federal courts asked to enjoin police actions in order to
defend constitutional rights? Or, will they consider themselves free to grant
equitable relief when an injunction might alleviate racial unrest created by
long-continued abuse of these rights, even when the conventional criteria for
equitable relief are not clearly satisfied?
Consideration of the potential effect of an injunction on community
race relations could revolutionize the framework of analysis applied in
police-injunction cases. It could entirely displace the conventional rationale
that a balance must be struck between the public interest in effective law
enforcement and the individual plaintiff's interest in the protection of his
rights. The claim for injunctive relief might no longer be thought of as an
assertion of the rights of the individuals who appear as plaintiffs before
the court, but as a plea for the protection of the interests of the community
at large against conduct which breeds social discord. Under such an analy-
sis, the conventional tests, useful only in determining the merits of an in-
dividual plaintiff's case, might pale into insignificance.
38. Id. at 202-03.
39. Id. at 203.
40. Id. at 203-05.
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The Fourth Circuit was not required to take such steps to reach its
result in Lankford. But its deliberate mention of the possible value of its
injunction in assuring racial peace may presage a significant development
in federal equity doctrine.
ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS OBTAINED
IN VIOLATION OF THE JUVENILE CODE
State v. Arbeiter, 408 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1966)
On December 3, 1963, Joseph Franz Arbeiter, age fifteen, was taken
into custody by the St. Louis police. The police suspected that Arbeiter
had fatally stabbed Mrs. Nancy Zanone the day before. Following an
interrogation, Arbeiter confessed to the stabbing. In the course of the
questioning, the police told Arbeiter that a witness placed him near the
Zanone residence at the time of the stabbing; in fact, there was no such
witness. Further, the police neglected to tell Arbeiter that Mrs. Zanone
had died as a result of the stabbing. Approximately four hours after
Arbeiter's apprehension he was turned over to the juvenile authorities.
Subsequently, Arbeiter was certified by the juvenile court to stand trial as
an adult, convicted of first degree murder, and sentenced to life imprison-
ment.
An appeal taken to the Supreme Court of Missouri resulted in the re-
versal of the conviction.' The court held that the failure of the police to
comply with section 211.061 of the Missouri Juvenile Code, requiring an
arresting officer to take a juvenile "immediately and directly before the
juvenile court," required a finding that Arbeiter's confession was inadmiss-
able.2
The proliferation of juvenile courts dating from the beginning of the
twentieth century has not been totally successful.' Increasingly, the juvenile
1. State v. Arbeiter, 408 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1966).
2. Id.
3. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 179,
183 N.E. 353, 356 (1932) (dissenting opinion); In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 610, 109
A.2d 523, 528 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955) (dissenting opinion); Antieau,
Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 387 (1961); Handler, The
Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wxs.
L. REv. 7; Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Juvenile Court, 7 CRIME & DELIN-
QUENCY 97 (1961); Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. Rnv. 547
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